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The trend of increased compensation among college football head coaches has been well 
documented. (Brady, E., Berkowitz, S., & Upton, J., 2012). Along with increased compensation have 
come elaborate contract dynamics and incentive clauses that reward coaches for academic and 
athletic performance. (Reynolds, 2012).  
The purpose of this study was to quantify the prevalence of incentive clauses in coaching 
contracts and determine incentive clauses’ effect on athletic and academic performance.  
This study analyzed 747 contract years from 78 public, FBS member institutions from 2002-
2012. Contract data was compared to athletic and academic performance information to determine 
whether incentive presence and/or size significantly affected performance outcomes. 
The majority of incentive conditions did not produce significantly different results when 
present in contracts. Similarly, for most incentive types, the size of incentives did not significantly 
affect performance outcomes. This study suggests that most incentive practices do not significantly 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
I-1. BACKGROUND 
When Charlie Strong signed an eight-year contract extension to remain the head football coach 
at the University of Louisville in January 2013, the University made a large investment in Strong’s 
abilities; an investment to the tune of $3.7 million dollars in annual base salary. While that figure 
might seem staggering in a vacuum, it was likely in line with the market value, as data indicate 43 
FBS head football coaches made $2 million or more in 2012 (Brady, Berkowitz, & Upton, 2012). 
Also, Strong’s Cardinals had just completed an 11-2 season, earned a share of the Big East 
Conference title, and won the school’s first ever Sugar Bowl (Staples, 2013). The pay raise made 
Strong the seventh highest paid active coach in college football and the highest paid coach outside 
the Southeastern, Big 12, and Big Ten conferences (Associated Press, 2013).  The University was 
undoubtedly impressed by Strong’s accomplishments and was willing to pay him even more for a 
repeat performance. 
Strong’s contract extension included several performance-based incentives, including a bonus of 
$308,333 for reaching a postseason bowl; $25,000 for winning the conference championship; up to 
$50,000 for a top-10 ranking; $100,000 for reaching a BCS bowl; and another $100,000 if Louisville 
wins the BCS championship (Associated Press, 2013).  
Strong is far from the only FBS coach whose contract includes incentive bonuses on top of base 
salary. A 2011 study of 84 FBS head coaching contracts found that in 2006 almost 93% of contracts 
included some form of incentive (Wilson, Schrager, Burke, Hawkins, & Gauntt, 2011). The most 
common form of bonus rewarded on-field performance with an average incentive value of $313,187. 
More than half of contracts also included an incentive for the team’s academic performance, at an 
average value of $22,673. 
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Examples of recent incentive-based bonuses dot the national map. In the PAC-12, Arizona 
State’s Todd Graham earns as much as $150,000 if ASU reaches certain academic standards and up 
to $750,000 for winning the BCS national championship. Colorado’s Mike MacIntyre can earn 
$50,000 for winning seven regular games and $25,000 more for an eighth regular-season win. In the 
Big Ten, Ohio State’s Urban Meyer makes $4 million in guaranteed salary, but also receives $100,000 
for meeting APR requirements and up to an extra $400,000 for appearing in the national title game. 
The incentive clauses don’t appear to benefit only head coaches, though. They can also be a way for 
schools to hedge their bets during contract negotiations. Clemson President James F. Barker 
conceptualized contracts incentives as a way of managing salary commitments as opposed to simply 
paying more in base salary and hoping for better results (Brady, et. al., 2012). 
 But do these incentive clauses actually work? Are they truly motivators that prod coaches to 
achieve otherwise less-likely goals, or do they simply serve as rewards that schools can use to defer 
additional salary payment until a coach’s potential is realized? Further, might it be possible that, 
regardless of whether they act as motivators or rewards, monetary incentives may not be the optimal 
form of compensation for FBS head coaches? In other words, does Urban Meyer truly value an 
extra $100,000 on top of his annual $4 million salary, or is there a more efficient way that Ohio State 
could serve Meyer’s interests? 
Consider the case of head coach Dabo Swinney and his coaching staff at Clemson. Swinney, 
who makes just more than $2 million annually in salary, was the nation’s 39th most highly paid head 
coach as of November 2012. In five seasons at Clemson, Swinney has won three division titles, won 
one Atlantic Coast Conference championship, and played in five bowl games, including an Orange 
Bowl appearance. As a top coach in a BCS conference, perhaps Swinney should be raking in more 
each season. Yet, Swinney appears to have made a conscience decision to take less in order to win 
more. Assistant coaches seemingly don't take pay cuts to come to Clemson. The school's 
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compensation pool for assistants has more than doubled from $1.9 million in 2009 to $4.2 million 
thanks in large part to Swinney agreeing to take less in bonuses. Clemson offensive coordinator 
Chad Morris, making $1.3 million, is the nation's most highly paid assistant at a public school. 
Morris also has an escalator clause in his contract stipulating that he be paid the average of the 
nation's two highest-paid offensive coordinators when the Tigers finish in the top five of total 
offense, or the average pay of the top three for finishing in the top 10 (Brady, et. al., 2012). 
Clemson’s model is one example of reallocating monetary resources in an attempt to 
maximize the chances of success. Consciously or not, Clemson athletic director Dan Radakovich has 
challenged conventional logic by not focusing on compensating his head coach.  Perhaps there are 
other similar opportunities for cost-savings and resource efficiency within coach compensation 
practices. This study aims to explore that question in regards to incentive clauses by investigating 
their correlation with success. 
I-2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to identify the level of correlation and/or effect between 
incentive clauses (both academic and athletic) in FBS head coaching contracts and achievement of 
the performance goals those clauses are intended to encourage.  In doing so, the study will also 
describe and quantify the prevalence and attributes of incentive clauses in FBS head coaching 
contracts. 
I-3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What are the most common types of incentives present in head football coaching contracts?  
2. What types of athletic or academic performance measures are most highly monetarily 
incented by contract incentive clauses? 
3. Does the presence of athletically related incentive clauses in head coach employment 
contracts have an effect on the team’s athletic performance? 
	   	  
	   4	  
4. Does the presence of academically related incentive clauses in head coach employment 
contracts have an effect on the team’s academic performance? 
5. Does the size (in real dollars and in comparison to total salary) of athletically related 
incentive clauses in head coach employment contracts have an effect on the team’s athletic 
performance? 
6. Does the size (in real dollars and in comparison to total salary) of academically related 
incentive clauses in head coach employment contracts have an effect on the team’s academic 
performance? 
I-4 HYPOTHESES 
The overwhelming prevalence of incentive clauses currently present in contracts provides 
evidence that administrators among FBS schools believe performance-based bonuses positively 
impact the likelihood of a team achieving success. The research hypothesis in conducting this study 
was that this positive correlation will be very weak, if at all existent. With so many bonuses currently 
offered and the great magnitude of annual salaries among successful coaches, it seems unlikely that 
additional performance-based incentives have a strong impact on a program’s motivation. 
I-5 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA): The major governing body of intercollegiate 
sport competition 
Division I (DI): The most competitive of the NCAA’s three divisions. 
Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS): The most competitive subdivision of NCAA DI football. 
Conferences and teams within the Bowl Subdivision compete for eligibility in postseason bowl 
games and the BCS National Championship. 
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Bowl Championship Series (BCS): A selection system relying on a combination of polls and 
computer selection methods to determine bowl game participants. Employed by FBS football 
schools and conferences from 1998 until 2014. (The BCS Is…, 2013) 
Performance-based incentive (incentive clause): Compensation enumerated within a coach’s 
employment contract above total salary and perquisites, which comes due only upon the completion 
of a stated individual or team goal. 
Coach: Head football coach of a public National Collegiate Athletic Association Football Bowl 
Series member institution. 
Academic Incentives: Relating to a team’s curricular educational matriculation, graduation, and 
performance. 
Athletic Incentives: Related to a team’s or coach’s on-field football performance (win/loss, 
standings, statistics, postseason bowl) or renown derived from football performance (awards or 
rankings). 
Guaranteed Compensation:  All compensation due to a coach under the terms of the contract 
during the contract year, but excluding one-time bonuses and deferred compensation. This figure 
does not include any contingent compensation such as amounts paid for completion of incentive 
bonuses. 
Content Analysis: The analysis of media and/or communication through the coding of its content . 
Unilateral Contract Theory: Theory of contract creation whereby both parties are bond by an 
enforceable contract upon one party completing an act requested by the other. This theory differs 
from traditional, bilateral contract theory, which requires an exchange of promises for future by 
both parties. 
	   	  
	   6	  
Agency Theory: Theoretical model that attempts to explain the relationship between agents and 
principals. Concerned with resolving problems arising when principal are unable to monitor agents’ 
efforts and when principals and agents have different attitudes toward risk. 
Institutional Isomorphism:  A similarity of the processes or structure of one organization to those 
of another by result of imitation or operating under similar conditions. 
Codebook: The basic document for content analysis; a record of all variables and the amount of 
times in an article a variable is coded.  
Winning percentage: The fraction of games a team has won. It is defined as wins divided by wins 
plus losses. Historical winning percentages will be retrieved from the NCAA FBS database. 
Academic Progress Rate (APR): A term-by-term measure of eligibility and retention for Division 
I student-athletes that was developed as an early indicator of eventual graduation rates. (NCAA, 
2013) 
Graduation Success Rate (GSR): NCAA developed measure designed to show the proportion of 
student-athletes on any given team who earn a college degree or end their enrollment in good 
academic standing. (What is the Graduation Success Rate?, 2014) 
Associated Press Poll: A weekly ranking of college football teams by a panel of 60 sports writers 
and broadcasters (Associated Press, 2014) 
National Coach of the Year: Recognition by any or all of five prominent voting memberships 
(Bryant, Robinson, AFCA, Dodd, Camp), tasked with determining the nation’s best collegiate 
football coach each season. 
Conference Coach of Year: Recognition as a conference’s best football coach each season by 
either an athletic conference’s coaches or selected media members. 
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I-6 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
This study considers only monetary incentives based on performance captured or able to be 
completed within a single football season. The study considers only incentives that pay a distinct 
dollar amount and does not include incentives that specify for a coach’s compensation to increase to 
a particular point (i.e. top three in the nation.) This study is limited to on-field athletic performance 
measures and academic performance measures. Though they exist, this study does not include other 
program-related performance incentives such as ticket sales and game attendance. 
I-7 RESEARCH DELIMITATIONS 
This study will account only for coaches at public schools with the NCAA’s Football Bowl 
Series. Because coaches’ contracts from private institutions are not publically available, their terms 
are not included within this study. Because public and private institutions both compete within the 
market for coaches, it is likely that trends reported in this study may be exhibited by private 
institutions as well. 
This study will investigate an eleven-season span, 2002-2012. While more time would allow for a 
more complete analysis of trends, eleven years may be adequate to discover the most pertinent 
recent developments. 
I-8 RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS 
The terms disclosed in the written contracts obtained from institutions through public 
records requests are complete and accurate representations of the agreements between coaches and 
institutions. Historical athletic and academic performance data reported by the NCAA will be 
complete and accurate. 
I-9 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
By exploring the effectiveness of contract incentives, this research will create more informed 
decision-making regarding athletic departments’ resource allocation. As athletic departments attempt 
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to fulfill numerous and varied goals (i.e. winning games, educating students, creating participation 
opportunities), administrators are forced to make decisions about how money and other resources 
will be assigned. This study will be useful in its ability to quantify the utility of contract incentive 
clauses. By gaining a fuller understanding of the return athletic departments can expect from their 
contractual guarantees, schools may be better positioned to invest resources more efficiently and 
effectively.  
Assuming the level of correlation between money assigned to potential incentives and the 
likelihood of realizing positive results can be identified, schools will be better able to account for 
risk. This study will have significance for at least five types of actors. First, a school contracting with 
a coach for services is the primary actor targeted by this research, which has the potential to inform 
decision-making. Likewise, coaches will be impacted because this research will result in information 
that can be utilized in contract negotiations. Tangentially, any additional parties working to broker 
the contract (attorneys or agents) may be affected as this research could impact the terms of the 
agreement. Fourth, schools and teams competing with the contracting school will be affected. If an 
athletic department is able to make more efficient use of its resources, that net benefit will spread to 
all aspects of its operation and theoretically result in more competitive teams. Finally, all NCAA 
member institutions could be affected directly and/or indirectly by this research. Schools will either 
internalize these results and revise their decision-making or they will experience the market effects of 
others’ changes. Regardless of how the change comes about, this research would have the potential 
to shift the economics of intercollegiate coaching contracts. 
By assessing the effectiveness of performance-based incentives, both sides of a negotiation may 
evaluate their continued importance. If incentive clauses do motivate better performance, then  
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perhaps they are a safe, cost-effective way for schools to achieve desired results. If, however, the 
monetary incentives are not highly correlated with success then perhaps a school and coach would 
prefer to allocate resources elsewhere or employ nonmonetary incentives to motivate success. 
	   	  






CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
II-1 PRIOR COACHING COMPENSATION ANALYSIS 
Research during the past decade has found a trend of increased revenues and expenditures 
within high-level intercollegiate athletics (Denhart & Vedder, 2010). Empirical evidence has 
demonstrated institutional propensity for devoting greater resources toward attracting and 
maintaining qualified and successful coaches in revenue-producing sports, such as football and 
basketball (Farmer & Pecorino, 2010). The shift in resource allocation is highly evident in the terms 
of coaching employment contracts (Berkowitz, Upton, & Schnaars, 2013). Either caused by or 
coinciding with greater coaching salaries, research regarding coaching contracts has also grown 
during the past few decades. Studies in the area of collegiate coach compensation have become 
increasingly more complex. 
  Initially, descriptive studies were undertaken merely to map the field of coaching contracts; 
they focused on discovering the most common clauses and terms being employed by each side in 
negotiations (Greenberg, 1992). Early conclusions found that college coaching contracts in revenue 
sports were quite sophisticated in language and risk allocation mechanisms. Martin Greenberg, a 
pioneer in the field of analyzing coaching contracts, found that the complexity of contracts for 
college coaches could vary widely; from a one-page letter of appointment to dozens of pages 
including complex clauses. Because there is no collectively bargained form contract for college 
coaches, as typically exist for professional athletes, Greenberg advocated for coaches seeking legal 
representation when negotiating contracts.  Greenberg also relied on additional duties placed on 
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coaches, such as fundraising and public relations, and increased rates of turnover in the profession 
to justify increases in compensation that were already evident in the early 1990s. Ultimately, 
Greenberg’s work was instructional as a guide to various types of clauses that coaches and schools 
were employing to hedge financial risk and plan for unsavory contingencies (Greenberg, 1992). 
Later, Maddux took a reverse-engineering approach to contract analysis by focusing on the contract 
clauses that best protected each party and caused the most eventual conflict between contracting 
parties (Maddux, 2010). Maddux found that, rather than becoming more simplified thanks to 20 
years of experience since Greenberg’s seminal work, coaches and schools were drafting still more 
complex agreements and positioning themselves for eventual termination even before relationships 
were formalized (Maddux, 2010). More specifically, Maddux found that the most common sources 
of litigation stemming from contracts between coaches and schools were liquidated damages clauses 
and disputes over termination with or without cause (Maddux, 2010). Both of these types of 
provisions speak to the interests of risk reduction served by contract as well as both parties’ 
understanding that coaching relationships can often resemble business transactions.   Finally in 2012, 
Reynolds, implemented a quantitative content analysis to examine the components of 91 head 
football coaches at FBS schools. The analysis coded for 31 distinct contract components, such as 
duties, terms of employments, and rollover provisions. Reynolds found that 12 of the 31 provisions 
used in the study were present in most every contract. The primary contractual components 
included duties and responsibilities; fringe benefits; base salary; radio, television, and internet; 
governing law and jurisdiction; outside income; summer camps; term; termination; buyout; and 
competitive bonus (Reynolds, 2012). Reynolds then concluded that the financial situation of a 
school often determined the frequency in which certain components were included in football 
coaches' contracts. 
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A second brand of studies has also emerged in which researchers sought to quantify 
coaching salaries and benefits. Instead of simply charting the landscape of contract language, these 
studies typically charted the growth of coaches’ income by comparing contemporary figures to 
historical amounts or by comparing coaching salaries in one field to those in another (Wilson, 
Schrager, Burke, Hawkins, & Gauntt, 2011). By and large, these types of studies found that the 
amount of resources devoted to coach employment was steadily increasing, especially as the 
responsibilities and stakes placed on coaches grew. In 2013, Wilson and Burke studied NCAA 
division I men’s basketball coaching contracts and found that coaches in non-automatic qualifying 
conferences received an 87.5% increase in average annual pay from 2009 to 2012. Wilson and Burke 
concluded that the same coaches were eligible for more than 1000% as much money in academic 
incentive payments (2013). In 2007, Martin Greenberg continued his contributions to the field by 
studying NCAA Division I assistant basketball coach contracts and found “an increased recognition 
of the important of good assistant coaches” which has resulted in rising assistant coach 
compensation (Greenberg, 2007, p. 27). Greenberg found a compensation disparity between larger 
and smaller athletic programs. He also discovered a compensation disparity between football and 
basketball assistant coaches with Division I football coaches' compensation rising fastest. Popular 
media also regularly contributes studies charting the growth in college football coaching 
compensation. USA Today has provided near-annual updates to their salary database with fresh 
batches of stories regarding skyrocketing salaries (Berkowitz, 2013). It was reported in 2013, that 
NCAA head football coaches were earning more than 10% more than in 2012 and 90% more than 
in 2006 (Grasgreen, 2013).  
A third branch of research has attempted to determine which criteria most influence the 
rates of coach compensation. This research has mapped specific job-related variables that affect 
compensation.  Inoue, Kent, Plehn-Dujowich, and Swanson (2010) examined the compensation of 
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NCAA FBS head football coaches, and found that the level of total compensation can be greatly 
explained by both institutional characteristics such as organizational size and coaches’ characteristics 
like coaching experience.  Then, in 2010, Inoue used success criteria previous identified in literature 
(Putler & Wolfe, 1999) — academic performance, on-field performance, behavior of student 
athletes, and revenue performance — to evaluate compensation determinants. Inoue’s analyses 
showed that two organizational characteristics, BCS membership and athletic revenues, had a 
significant positive effect on both on-field performance incentives and total incentives (Inoue, 
2010). The analysis also investigated incentive clauses and found that 78 of the 84 contracts (92.9%) 
contained some type of incentives with the average total incentive of $343,747. With respect to the 
extent of each category used, on-field performance was the most frequently used category, appearing 
in all 78 contracts (92.9%), followed by academic performance with 45 contracts (53.6%), revenue 
performance with 23 (27.4%), and student athlete behavior with 3 (3.6%). On-field performance was 
also the most highly valued category for incentive payments with a mean value of  $313,187, 
compared to $22,673 for academic performance, $18,500 for revenue performance, and $2,417 for 
student-athlete behaviors (Inoue, et. al., 2011). 
In 2011, Humphrey also examined contracts for NCAA FBS head football coaches in order 
to investigate the determinants of both maximum compensation and guaranteed compensation 
(Humphrey, 2011). Using univariate regression analysis, he determined there to be a significant 
difference (α =.01) for both the length of an NCAA FBS head football coach’s career tenure as well 
as his university tenure, between high compensation agreements and low compensation agreements. 
He also concluded that guaranteed compensation was positively and significantly related to a head 
coach’s tenure. These results were explained by hypothesizing that as a head coach performed 
positively in the eyes of the university and the eyes of his professional colleagues, as reflected by 
career length and tenure at the university, less uncertainty remained on behalf of the university and 
	   	  
	   14	  
market about future performance. Likewise, Humphrey found significant differences between the 
coach’s winning percentage in his current position, career winning percentage, number of career 
wins, and average attendance, between high compensation contracts and low compensation 
contracts (Humphrey, 2011). 
The area where these past studies have yet to investigate is where this current study intends 
to explore. The object of this study is to quantify the effectiveness of incentive clauses in FBS head 
football coach contracts.  Whereas previous contract analyses have considered external factors such 
as athletic and academic performance in attempting to explain compensation magnitude and/or 
frequency, this study will employ the opposite approach and treat compensation levels, more 
specifically incentive offers, as independent variables. By analyzing incentive offers alongside 
documented performance, this study aims to determine effectiveness of incentive clauses. This 
approach will empower decision-makers with useful knowledge that can be utilized when allocated 
limited resources. 
II-2 THEORETICAL BASES 
The research will be guided by the use of three distinct research theories: unilateral contract 
theory, agency theory, and institutional isomorphism. Unilateral contract theory will explain the 
benefits schools gain by making promises to coaches that can be fulfilled only by action, rather than 
a reciprocal promise. Agency theory will be used to explore the tension that exists in relationships 
between principals and agents and how both parties can work to minimize risk. Finally, the theory of 
institutional isomorphism will potentially explain why incentive clauses have become so common in 
collegiate sport, regardless of their objectively-measured worth.  
i. UNILATERAL CONTRACT THEORY 
The theoretical framework for this study has been developed through three distinct fields of 
research. One, from the legal perspective, is the theory of unilateral contracts. These are exchanges 
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in which one contracting party makes an enforceable promise in exchange for another party’s future 
action. The theory underlying these exchanges posits that situations arise in which a contracting 
party places far less value on a reciprocal promise than they do on future performance (Ames, 1899). 
“When an act is wanted in return for a promise, a unilateral contract is created when the act is done” 
(Wormser, 1916, p. 136). Like a traditional bilateral contract, which is created by two or more parties 
exchanging promises, unilateral contracts are enforceable in court. They are the preferable form of 
contract for an incentive clause, for instance, because the school’s obligation to pay an incentive 
bonus will come due only when the coach has performed the desire action that is specified by the 
contract. The coach is never bound to perform the action and, until performance is rendered, the 
school is not obligated to pay. While this is not a conceptually difficult or controversial application 
of the theory of unilateral contract, the existence of binding unilateral contracts allows for incentive 
payment schemes to be employed and legally enforced. It is unlikely that an incentive clause, or a 
bonus clause of any type to go even further, would take the form of a traditional bilateral contract. 
Simply stated, a coach’s promise to apply his or her best efforts is of little value to a school beyond 
the salary that the coach will already be paid. Further, it is questionable under contract theory 
whether a coach’s mere promise is sufficient to entitle him or her to incentive payment, as best 
effort is already a condition of the underlying contract and not a new burden. Therefore, unilateral 
contract formation appears the only conceivable route for effective incentive clause formation. 
ii. AGENCY THEORY 
 A second theory to be explored by this study is principal-agent relationships. This field of 
study explores situations in which the motivations of agents, those employed to act on behalf of a 
principal, may not be properly aligned with the interests of their principals (Baker, 1992). Empirical 
evidence suggests that problems arise when principal-agent motivations are not properly balanced, 
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but research has also suggested that incentive arrangements have the potential to reduce these 
harms.  
The seminal research in this field is widely considered to be that of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) who suggested that the chief goal of compensation agreements is to create incentives that 
motivate agents to align their goals with principals. Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) later hedged 
this advice by warning that compensation can be a solution to agency problems, but improper 
compensation may also increase agency problems. The fear, as the authors found, is that ill-
conceived incentives can actually motivate unproductive behavior or agents may behave unethically 
in order to complete incented goals. Humphrey explains: 
A compensation agreement providing the agent with guaranteed compensation may lead to 
inefficiencies and overall poor performance, to the detriment of the principal. On the other 
hand, a compensation agreement providing only performance incentives may entice the 
principal to manipulate earnings, revenues, or any other performance measure upon which 
the agent’s compensation is based” (Humphrey, 2011, p. 8). 
 In fact, Healy (1985) indicates that bonus incentives are only effective in aligning managers’ 
interests with the interests of shareholders when they are close to meeting bonus criteria. If a goal is 
too far from being achieved, it may not be viewed as feasible and will not affect productivity. In 
response to the threat of unethical behavior on the part of agents, Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck 
(2004) suggest that increased governance, oversight, or enforcement systems are necessary. 
It is a goal of this study to investigate the effectiveness of agent incentives in the field of 
college football coaching. As college football coaches are generally highly-compensated, highly-
motivated employees, there is some room for skepticism as to whether incentives are truly necessary 
and whether they motivate greater effort. If, conversely, incentive agreements function as a form of 
structured reward system for positive performance then they may not be serving the same purposes 
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as agency-principal incentives. A greater understanding of the agreements’ true purpose for both 
parties may be achieved by studying the rate of fulfillment and return on the promises. 
iii. INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM 
Finally, the theory of institutional isomorphism will be used to help explain why similarly 
situated actors in an industry behave similarly. Generally, the theory has posited that actors 
occasionally may forsake their own objective best interests in order to follow established institutional 
logic and mirror the actions of their peers (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Rather than risk untested, 
potentially beneficial behavior, actors will behave in established ways as a means of exuding 
legitimacy and avoiding criticism. 
The theory will be tested as a means of resolving a simple question: Why do so many schools 
so consistently offer incentive bonuses to head football coaches? As mentioned above, more than 
90% of current contracts appear to contain at least one incentive clause. Is it because these clauses 
are effective at producing desired results? Perhaps they are bargaining mechanisms that allocate risk 
and cost more appropriately between the parties? Or maybe incentive clauses are simply a popular, 
established, and yet untested institutional logic. In other words, maybe schools and coaches are 
seizing on such clauses because other schools and coaches, presumably for legitimate reasons, 
adopted them as well. 
 Dimaggio and Powell (1983) posited three potential, but not theoretically or empirically 
distinct, sources of isomorphism: 1. Coercive isomorphism, which stems from an actor’s need to 
gain legitimacy; 2. Mimetic isomorphism, by which actors reduce perceived uncertainty; and 3. 
Normative isomorphism, a process that tends to occur as actors look to one another in determining 
how best to structure complex, professionalized organizations.  It appears conceivable, if not likely, 
that at least one of these processes could explain the expanded prevalence of incentive clauses in 
coaches’ contracts.  
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In terms of coercive pressure, schools and coaches may view such clauses as a means to 
make their agreements appear legitimate and worthwhile. A coach with incentive clauses can feel 
he’s struck a bargain at least as worthy as other coaches with such clauses. Likewise, a school that 
structures powerful incentives might be signaling itself as a prime contender in the market. Taking 
the logic a step further, schools and coaches can compare themselves to their peers on the basis of 
their incentive clauses. Arguably, the coach with the most to gain in maximum incentive payments 
would feel he has reached the best deal.  
The case for incentive clauses as a type of mimetic isomorphism might be conceived as 
schools and coaches being unsure of the type or magnitude of terms to be included in an agreement. 
Experience suggests there are no longer FBS coaches whose contracts stipulate merely salary and 
term. The stakes of high-level college football have become too great and each side of the 
transaction has too much to lose to simply shake hands and hope for the best. Therefore, it is in 
both parties’ best interest to hedge its bet and protect against the worst case, but how? Incentive 
clauses may present a tried and true method of risk allocation. While it’s possible that schools and 
coaches are plugging in ready-made clause constructions that may not be optimal for their situations, 
they are probably better than having no such clauses or starting from scratch. Therefore, in an 
attempt to hedge risk and lower transaction cost, actors are more likely to mimic what already exists. 
Finally, on a related note, incentive clauses may be an attempt to organize the complex chaos 
that is FBS coaching. Just as the clauses can bring order to contract negotiation by providing a 
starting block, each party might view the clauses as a method of structuring their operations similarly 
to their peers. Modern FBS coaching is a vast job with potential competing goals and ample 
delegation. A school and coach are better served to mirror the operations of other programs in 
deciding how best to allocate time and resources. One method of this mirroring might be to borrow 
from previously used contract terms. The contract is a foundation of the relationship between a 
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coach and school. By memorializing both parties’ understanding of an agreement, the contract hints 
at how much priority should be placed on various tasks. Borrowing the contract mechanisms of 
peers allows schools and coaches to normalize their business operations. 
Combined, these theories provide a multi-faceted lens through which the quantitative 
aspects of this study can be interpreted to facilitate explanation of observed behavior. 
	   	  






CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
III-1 SURVEY INSTRUMENTS 
The main research methodology for this study was contract and historical record review. By 
reviewing and analyzing the contracts of FBS head coaches, the study identified each coach’s 
guaranteed compensation, the types of incentive clauses present in each contract, the criteria for 
completing each incentive condition, and the incentive’s respective size. Thereafter, a series of 
historical records related to athletic and academic performance (ex., winning percentage, bowl 
appearances, APR) were collected for the school where each coach was employed during each 
contract year of the study. By analyzing the contract variables (compensation, incentive type and 
size) against the performed athletic and academic outcomes, correlation levels and sample means 
could be identified. 
This study employed quantitative statistical techniques to assess the level of correlation 
between variables and the statistical significance of differences in sample means. Although the study 
did not require traditional surveying or interviewing methods common to qualitative studies, it did 
involve surveying software to improve the efficiency and accuracy of content analysis data 
collection. 
 By employing Qualtrics software, data collection through contractual content analysis was 
performed in a repeatable step-by-step process. Each contract year analyzed separately as a data 
point and contract compensation amounts were compared to historical results. The Qualtrics 
software was used to create a reliable series of questions to be answered in analyzing each contract. 
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As each contract was reviewed, Qualtrics presented appropriate questions to be answered regarding 
the contract using logic-based display and then stored the results. This process minimized the risk of 
human error in data entry, organization, or storage. Also, Qualtrics’ logic-based question 
presentation created more efficient analysis by eliminating redundancy. For instance, when the coder 
responded that a contract does not include clauses related to post-season play, the software bypassed 
additional questions about such clauses. This algorithm improved accuracy by minimizing the risk of 
incorrect entry and significantly reduced the time spent in coding. 
III-2 DRAWING THE SAMPLE 
 The creation of the sample began by creating a list of each public institution that competed 
in the NCAA FBS for during the 11-year period of 2002-2012. This list is comprised of 104 
educational institutions, including U.S. military service academies. From this list of institutions, a list 
was compiled of each school’s head football coach during each season of the 11-year period. For 
seasons where more than one head coach was employed at a school, all head coaches during that 
season were included in the list. The employment contracts of these coaches, who spent at least 
some time employed as the head coach of a public FBS school from 2002-2012, were included in the 
potential sample for the study. Other schools were members of the NCAA’s FBS for only a portion 
of the 11-year span. For these schools, any season in which a school competed as an FBS member 
was considered a contract year for the study. This study’s potential sample included approximately 
1,100 contract years. This figure was arrived upon by multiplying the number of schools in the study 
(104) by the number of years surveyed (11). The actual number of potential contracts to be surveyed 
was considerably fewer than 1,100, as many coaches were employed at schools for multiple years 
under the same contracts. The actual number of subjects in the sample was 747, as it was not be 
possible to acquire contracts from each institution for all 11 years.  
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III-3 ACQUIRING CONTRACTS 
 Once the pertinent employment contracts were identified, open records requests were 
submitted to each of the FBS public schools. The requests specified which contracts were desired by 
listing the name of the coach(es) and years during which they served as head football coach. For 
instance, if an institution employed four coaches between the years of 2002 and 2012, the public 
records request would name all four of the coaches and call for all employment contracts between 
each of the coaches and the institution during the 11-year period. The request also specifies during 
which season each coach was employed in an attempt to aid the request recipient and expedite the 
retrieval process. All requests were initially sent to the University Counsel’s office at each institution, 
unless the office’s website specified a different custodian of records. In cases where the University 
Counsel’s office was not the custodian of records or overseer of public record requests, additional 
requests were forwarded or rerouted to a more appropriate recipient. 
 In addition to receiving employment contracts through open records requests, the sample 
was also drawn, as appropriate, from the publically available database of USA Today. For both the 
2006 and 2009 football seasons, USA Today compiled databases of football head coach 
compensation figures and PDF copies of the coaches’ most recent contracts. These databases were 
utilized to supplement the open record requests and verify request responses. In total, contracts for 
at least seven of the 11 specified seasons were received from 78 (75%) of the 104 potential schools. 
A total of 747 contract seasons comprised the final acquired, useable sample. 
III-4 CONTRACT REVIEW 
Once the contracts were acquired, each contract was reviewed to identify the seasons during 
which it was in force, the coach’s base salary for each season, any other guaranteed compensation 
(excluding deferred compensation) that was due to the coach, and the presence, type, and size of any 
athletic or academic incentive clauses.  Throughout the review process, an expanding list of 
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incentive clause types was created. Because the parties to each contract create incentive clauses 
individually, the clauses are inherently diverse and can be tied to almost any conceivable outcome. 
Therefore, in order to ensure sufficiently large sets of grouping variable and promote useful analysis, 
it was necessary to limit the types of incentives that would be included in the study. From the list of 
all observed incentive types, the final survey and contract review process included only 30 types of 
incentives. The included incentives are as follow: 
1. Overall season winning percentage 
2. Conference championship game participation OR division championship 
3. Conference championship game victory OR conference championship 
4. Single-season Academic Progress Rate 
5. Graduation Success Rate 
6. Non-BCS Bowl participation 
7. Non-BCS Bowl victory 
8. BCS Bowl participation 
9. BCS Bowl victory 
10. National championship game participation 
11. National championship game victory 
12. National Coach of the Year award 
13. Conference Coach of the Year award 
14. 7-win season 
15. 8-win season 
16. 9-win season 
17. 10-win season 
18. 11-win season 
19. 12-win season 
20. 13-win season 
21. 14-win season 
22. Final ranking in Top 25 
23. Final ranking in Top 5 
24. Final ranking in Top 10 
25. Final ranking in Top 15 
26. Final ranking in Top 20 
27. 5 conference wins 
28. 6 conferences wins 
29. 7 conference wins 
30. 8 conference wins 
 
Any other incentives present beyond these 30 were denoted for the sake of completion, but 
were not recorded as a part of the study. The most common additional incentives related to team 
grade point average, ticket sales, game attendance, and television exposure. 
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Each contract was coded for the type(s) of clause it contained, any thresholds necessary for 
completion of incentives, and the monetary size of each clause. By dividing the size of each 
incentive by the coach’s total guaranteed compensation for each contract year, each incentive size 
was also recorded as a proportion of total guaranteed compensation. 
III-5 HISTORICAL RECORD REVIEW 
 After compiling the list of incentive clause types to be included in the study, the 
performance variables relevant to this study were identified. Performance variables data (ex: winning 
%, bowl game appearances, conference titles, team APR), were collected from the NCAA’s 
publically-available statistical database to identify the variable values for each coach during each 
contract year. These performance figures were also entered into the survey instrument for each 
contract year. Winning percentage figures were calculated by comparing the team’s overall wins for a 
season, including post-season competition, to the number of total games played. For any season in 
which wins have been vacated as part of NCAA sanctions or for any other reason, win totals were 
recorded as though the wins had not be vacated. This method allowed for a more accurate 
representation of history as it occurred. Coaching accolades were construed liberally, as school’s 
rarely specified which “Coach of the Year” vote was to be utilized in determining success. 
Therefore, if the coach was awarded National Coach of the Year by any of the five most prominent 
organizations (Bryant, Robinson, AFCA, Dodd, Camp), a successful result was recorded. Similarly, 
recognition through either a conference’s coaches’ or media vote sufficed for a Conference Coach 
of the Year success. Final ranking data was collected from the Associated Press Top 25 polls only. 
III-6 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
 The collected data was analyzed using descriptive statistics, mean comparisons, analyses of 
variance (ANOVA), chi-square tests, and simple regression techniques.  
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 Descriptive statistics such as frequency, mean, median, maximum, and minimum were used 
to analyze the size, frequency, and range of incentives. Such counts and calculations were performed 
to determine the total number of incentives present during the study, overall occurrence of each 
incentive type, the completion rate of each incentive, and the size of each incentive on average. 
 T-tests and ANOVAs were employed to compare sample means both to access the effect of 
incentive size and the change in average incentive size across conferences and seasons. Each mean 
comparison was analyzed using an α level of .05 and post hoc tests were performed following each 
significant omnibus ANOVA test. 
 Chi-square tests allowed frequencies to be compared across conferences and seasons as well 
as testing for any effect due to the presence of each incentive type on the rate of performance 
success. 
 Finally, simple regressions were performed to determine the relationship between 
continuous variable such as incentive size and performance outcomes. Regressions analyzed the 
correlation between incentive size and performance success among academic variables and win 
outcomes. Regressions were also used to test the correlation between total compensation and overall 
incentive frequency and size.
	   	  





CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
1. Incentive Clause Frequency and Size 
 
 A total of 747 contract years from a selection of 78 public FBS schools were sampled across 
11 seasons from 2002-2012. Among these 747 contract years, 702 (94%) contained at least one 
incentive clause that was of a type included in this study. Table 1 below displays the frequency and 
completion rate of each type of incentive across the duration of all 11 seasons. The most frequent 
clauses present among all the contract years incented participation in BCS bowl games (627) and 
Non-BCS bowl games (635). For the sake of coding, National Championship game appearances, 
victories, and incentives were treated separately from BCS bowl appearances, victories, and 
incentives. Therefore, if a contract specified that it incented a National Championship game 
appearance or victory, that clause would not be coded as a BCS bowl game incentive, although the 
National Championship game is customarily considered within the Bowl Championship Series. 
Similarly, a National Championship appearance or victory was not coded as a BCS Bowl appearance 
or victory. One other important factor to consider in assessing incentive clause frequency is that the 
Academic Progress Rate regime was first introduced in 2004 and Graduation Success Rates were 
first calculated in 2005. Although clauses incenting graduation prior to GSR were coded as 
graduation rate incentives, one would expect the overall frequency of graduation and APR incentives 
to be low during the beginning of the 11-year time period. 
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The overall completion percentage of each incentive type is also displayed in Table 1. These 
percentages were arrived upon by dividing the total number of each incentive that was offered into 
the number of contract years in which the incentive was successfully accomplished. 
Table 1. 
Incentive Frequency and Completion Rate 
Incentive Type Frequency Completion Rate 
Non-BCS Bowl 
Participation 635 49.9% 
BCS Bowl Participation 627 7.3% 
Conference 
Championship Victory 589 12.9% 
Conference Coach of the 
Year 362 12.4% 
National Coach of the 
Year 322 1.9% 
Conference 
Championship 
Participation 313 19.5% 
National Championship 
Victory 305 0.98% 
Graduation Rate 236 41.7% 
National Championship 
Participation 233 6.4% 
Top 25 219 17.3% 
Academic Progress Rate 172 54.1% 
Top-10 168 19.0% 
9-win Season 142 26.1% 
10-win Season 140 15.7% 
8-win Season 133 39.1% 
11-win Season 123 5.7% 
Second Graduation Rate 117 15.4% 
Non-BCS Bowl Victory 114 12.3% 
BCS Bowl Victory 114 1.7% 
12-win Season 105 6.7% 
Third Graduation Rate 97 4.1% 
7-win Season 84 45.2% 
Second APR 75 36.0% 
Fourth Graduation Rate 52 7.0% 
Top-20 49 22.4% 
Third APR 47 40.4% 
Top-5 46 13.0% 
Top-15 43 7.0% 
5 Conference wins 33 31.3% 
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6 Conference wins 29 17.2% 
Fifth Graduation Rate 24 7.0% 
7 Conference wins 22 4.6% 
8 Conference wins 22 3.0% 
Winning Percentage 16 62.5% 
Fourth APR 9 33.3% 
 
On average, each contract year contained more than seven and a half incentive clauses (M = 
7.66, SD = 4.33) with a median value of 8 incentive clauses per contract year and a study-high 22 
incentive clauses present in Steve Sarkisian’s contract with the University of Washington for the 
2011 season. Table 2 presents the average number of incentives offered in each contract year by 
season. The means show an obvious upward trend each year as incentives became more 
standardized. An omnibus between subjects ANOVA concluded that the difference in means 
between seasons was significant F(10, 736) = 8.21, p < .001. Appendix F features the post-hoc tests 
from this ANOVA, which show statistically significant differences in the total number of incentives 
offered on average between the earlier and later seasons in the study.  
Table 2  
Incentive Frequency by Year 
Season n Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
2002 44 4.61 4.24 0 17 
2003 51 5.98 4.07 0 17 
2004 61 6.36 4.48 0 18 
2005 69 6.51 4.55 0 18 
2006 74 6.70 4.38 0 18 
2007 74 7.68 4.17 0 18 
2008 74 8.34 4.05 0 18 
2009 74 8.77 3.96 0 19 
2010 74 8.70 3.61 3 19 
2011 74 9.27 3.86 3 22 
2012 78 9.22 4.12 0 21 
Total 747 7.66 4.33 0 22 
 
Table 3 displays the average and median value in dollars of each type of incentive offered, as 
well as the average and maximum worth of incentive clauses as a function of total compensation 
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across the study’s 11 season. As the table is sorted by average value, National Championship game 
appearances and victories were the mostly highly incented activities by dollar value. BCS bowl 
appearances and conference championship wins were, on average, worth a higher percentage of a 
coach’s total guaranteed compensation within the contract years during which these incentives 
appeared. 
Table 3  
Incentive Size by Type 










233 $178,893 $150,000 4.2% 75.0% 
Top-5  46 $152,173 $150,000 0.5% 22.9% 
Top-15  43 $86,232 $100,000 0.3% 12.5% 
BCS Bowl 
Participation  
627 $85,283 $75,000 9.0% 83.3% 
Top-20  49 $68,367 $50,000 0.4% 20.5% 




589 $66,784 $40,000 5.4% 58.7% 
Fifth Graduation 
Rate  
24 $61,416 $45,000 0.2% 27.3% 
Third Graduation 
Rate  
97 $59,559 $45,000 0.8% 32.3% 
Fourth 
Graduation Rate 
52 $53,358 $40,000 0.4% 25.0% 




313 $45,361 $25,000 1.8% 35.2% 
National Coach of 
the Year  
 
322 
$42,068 $50,000 1.9% 15.4% 
BCS Bowl Victory  114 $41,435 $25,000 0.9% 36.4% 
5 Conference wins 33 $38,757 $25,000 0.1% 7.8% 
Second 
Graduation Rate 
117 $37,548 $30,000 0.6% 16.1% 
12-win Season  105 $34,265 $10,000 0.5% 17.4% 
Non-BCS Bowl 
Participation  
635 $34,157 $25,000 3.6% 25.8% 
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7 Conference wins  22 $33,636 $25,000 0.1% 7.5% 
8 Conference wins 22 $33,636 $25,000 0.1% 7.5% 
Second APR  75 $33,086 $20,000 0.3% 11.1% 
Fourth APR  9 $29,444 $20,000 0.1% 12.5% 
Graduation Rate 236 $28,458 $20,000 0.8% 10.4% 
11-win Season  123 $28,138 $10,000 0.5% 28.6% 
6 Conference wins 29 $27,206 $25,000 0.1% 5.0% 
Top 25 219 $24,763 $25,000 1.2% 18.2% 
8-win Season  133 $22,399 $10,000 0.5% 17.4% 
Academic 
Progress Rate  
172 $22,056 $12,500 0.5% 12.0% 
10-win Season  140 $21,600 $10,000 0.5% 17.4% 
Conference Coach 
of the Year  
362 $21,117 $25,000 1.2% 11.2% 
9-win Season  142 $19,848 $10,000 0.4% 17.4% 
7-win Season  84 $18,994 $6,000 0.3% 17.4% 
Non-BCS Bowl 
Victory  
114 $15,419 $10,000 0.5% 9.6% 
Winning 
Percentage  
16 $7,166 $5,000 0.1% 3.3% 
 
Similar to Table 2, which showed incentive frequency by season, Table 4 displays the average 
overall dollar amounts that schools offered through incentive clauses and the average size of all 
incentives compared to total compensation during each season. Again, a clear and statistically 
significant F(10, 736) = 8.57, p < .001 trend of increased spending on incentives exists from an 
average of $185,623 in 2002 to $712,190 in 2012. Appendix F contains the post-hoc tests for total 
incentive dollars offered and it displays statistically significant increases in mean spending across the 
progression of seasons within the study. 
 The final measure of difference in incentive size across seasons performed within this study 
concerned the average size of total incentives offerings relative to total guaranteed compensation. 
Table 4 reveals the results of this test, which showed a significant difference F(10, 736) = 2.05, p = 
.027 in the size of incentive offering as a percentage of total compensation. 
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 Just as in the previous tests, Table 4 displays a trend of increased incentive clause value from 
30.8% of total compensation in 2002 to a height of 53.7% in 2011. Appendix F, which contains the 
post hoc tests for this analysis, shows significant increases in incentive spending relative to total 
compensation as the seasons progress from 2002 through 2012. 
Table 4 
Total Incentive Offerings in Dollars and Relative to Total Compensation 
Season n Mean ($) Min. ($) Max. ($) Mean (%) Min. (%) Max.(%) 
2002 44 185,623 0 957,000 30.9 .00 156.45 
2003 51 268,728 0 2,222,666 42.0 .00 261.49 
2004 61 300,879 0 2,222,666 42.2 .00 261.49 
2005 69 338,697 0 1,950,000 42.5 .00 162.50 
2006 74 364,962 0 1,950,000 42.8 .00 133.00 
2007 74 429,915 0 1,950,000 48.9 .00 199.41 
2008 74 506,192 0 1,950,000 52.3 .00 262.50 
2009 74 564,348 0 1,950,000 53.4 .00 131.25 
2010 74 578,673 33,500 2,900,000 53.7 6.71 183.87 
2011 74 678,301 33,500 2,900,000 53.0 5.86 180.65 
2012 78 712,190 0 3,025,000 49.7 .00 180.65 
Total 747 468,814 0 3,025,000 47.4 .00 262.50 
 
 
2. Effect of Incentive Clause Presence 
 The second function of this study is to analyze the effect of incentive clause presence on a 
team’s likelihood of attaining the performance that the incentive is designed to motivate. These 
analyses were performed using chi-square tests to compare the frequency of outcomes among teams 
that did and did not incent particular athletic or academic performance outcomes. The chi-square 
tests allowed the observed frequency of each outcome to the expected frequencies. For instance, 313 
of the 747 contract years surveyed contained an incentive for conference championship game 
participation. Therefore, 434 did not contain such an incentive. Among the 313 contract years 
incented for conference championship participation, 61 contract years resulted in participation 
attainment and 252 did not attain conference championship game participation. Conversely, of the 
434 contract years that did not incent this outcome, 18 managed to attain conference championship 
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participation and 416 did not. These results, which demonstrate a statistically significant increase in 
attainment among incented contract years χ2 (1, N = 747,) = 45.26, p < .001 are displayed fully in 
Table 5, along with all other significant chi square tests.  
Table 5 
Effect of Incentive Presence 
Performance Outcome Attained? χ2 Conference Championship Participation 
Incentive Present? No Yes  
Yes 416 18 45.256 
 (1.4) (-4.1)  
No 252 61  
 
 (-1.7) (4.8)  
 Non-BCS Bowl Participation Incentive 
Present? 
   
 Yes 318 317 13.320 
  (-1.0) (1.0)  
 No 77 35  
  (2.3) (-2.4)  
 National Championship Participation 
Incentive Present? 
   
 Yes 218 15 23.365 
  (-.6) (4.0)  
 No 511 3  
  (.4) (-2.7)  
 Conference Coach of the Year 
Incentive Present? 
   
 Yes 317 45 5.016 
  (-.5) (1.5)  
 No 356 29  
  (.5) (-1.5)  
 Top-5 Incentive Present?    
 Yes 40 6 5.718 
  (.1) (-.6)  
 No 667 34  
  (-.5) (2.3)  
 Top-10 Incentive Present?    
 Yes 136 32 18.675 
  (-1.2) (3.6)  
 No 535 44  
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  (.7) (-1.9)  
 Non-BCS Bowl Victory Incentive 
Present? 
   
 Yes 100 14 7.008 
  (1.1) (-2.2)  
 No 485 148  
  (-.5) (.9)  
 11-win Season Incentive Present?    
 Yes 116 7 5.434 
  (.7) (-2.0)  
 No 542 82  
  (-.3) (.9)  
 Top 25 Incentive Present?    
 Yes 183 36 5.502 
  (.9) (-1.7)  
 No 400 128  
  (-.6) (1.1)  
Note. All results in this Table are significant at p-value < .05. Adjusted standardized residuals appear 
in parentheses below group frequencies. 
 
 Chi-square tests were performed to analyze the effect of incentive presence for all 30 
incentive types identified in this study. In addition to conference championship game participation, 
significantly higher rates of performance outcome attainment were found in contract years which 
incented the following outcomes: Non-BCS bowl participation χ2 (1, N = 747,) = 13.32, p < .001; 
National Championship game participation χ2 (1, N = 747,) = 23.37, p < .001; Conference Coach of 
the Year χ2 (1, N = 747,) = 5.02, p =.025; Top-5 ranking χ2 (1, N = 747,) = 5.72, p =.017; and Top-
10 ranking χ2 (1, N = 747,) = 18.68, p < .001. 
 The presence of sixteen incentive types did not lead to statistically significant changes in the 
frequency of performance outcomes. These incentives types were Conference championship victory, 
BCS bowl participation, BCS bowl victory, National Championship Victory, National Coach of the 
Year, 7-win season, 8-win season, 9-win season, 10-win season, 12-win season, Top-15 ranking, 
Top-20 ranking, 5 conference wins, 6 conference wins, 7 conference wins, and 8 conference wins. 
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The full tables displaying the observed frequencies, adjusted standardized residuals, and χ2 values for 
these performance outcomes can be found in Appendix A.  
 Three other incentives did lead to statistically significant differences between expected and 
observed outcome frequencies. These differences, however, were in the opposite direction as 
incented contract years were less likely to attain the desired outcome and non-incented contract 
years attained the outcome more often than expected. For example, Table 5 displays the chi-square 
test outcome for the condition of Non-BCS bowl victory incentive presence χ2 (1, N = 747,) = 7.01, 
p =.008. In this scenario, one would have expected between 24 and 25 of the 114 contract years to 
result in non-BCS bowl wins, but only 14 did. Conversely, 148 of the 633 non-incented contract 
years resulted in non-BCS bowl victories compared to the expected count of approximately 137. 
Similar significant results in an inverse direction were found for the presence of 11-win season χ2 (1, 
N = 747,) = 5.43, p =.020) and top-25 ranking incentives χ2 (1, N = 747,) = 5.502, p =.019. These 
results are also summarized in Table 5 above. 
 The effect of incentives related to Academic Progress Rates and Graduation Success Rates 
were also considered within this study. Unlike the chi-square method that was utilized to analyze the 
effect of other incentives, the presence of APR and GSR incentives were measured using t-tests to 
compare sample means. Because APR and GSR are continuous variables, their values were averaged 
and compared between treatment groups to determine whether differences in average based on 
incentive presence were significant. The t-test for APR presence did result in a statistically significant 
difference t(623) = 3.49, p = .001 and is displayed below in Table 6. The 135 contract years with at 
least one incentive for APR had an average single-season APR score of 951.67 (SD =26.44), which 
was significantly higher than the average score of 942.41 (SD =27.48) among contract years without 
APR incentives. The presence of GSR incentives did not result in a statistically significant mean 
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difference t(370) = 0.49,  (p=0.624). The t-test results for GSR presence can also be found in Table 
6. 
Table 6 
Effect of APR Incentive Presence 
 Incentive Present?   
 Yes No t df 











The final series of tests investigating the effect of incentive presence focused on incentives 
related to season win totals, both in conference and overall. Again, t-tests were utilized for these 
analyses as wins are continuous variables and can be compared via averages. Although tests were 
conducted comparing means from 10 pairs of treatment groups, none of the t-tests resulted in 
statistically significant differences in average number of wins at an α level of .05. Table 7 displays the 
p-values for the difference in mean between treatment groups of each win outcome incentive. 
Complete tables of these t-test results can be found in Appendix B. 
Table 7 
Non Significant Incentive Presence 
Incentive type t df p  
5 conference wins -1.885 745 .060 
6 conference wins  -1.628 745 .104 
7-win season -1.584 745 .114 
7 conference wins -1.422 745 .156 
8 conference wins -1.422 745 .156 
11-win season -1.047 745 .295 
9-win season .725 745 .469 
12-win season .589 745 .556 
10-win season .340 745 .734 
8-win season .215 745 .830 
 
3. Effect of Incentive Clause Size 
 To assess the effect of incentive size on athletic and academic performance, comparisons of 
means through t-tests were again employed. This time, however, instead of grouping treatments 
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based upon incentive presence, treatment groups were created based upon incentive 
accomplishment. All contract years that provided an incentive for a particular outcome and during 
which that outcome was attained were compared to all contract years during which an outcome was 
incented but not attained. By comparing the difference in size between incentive clauses of those 
contract years when an incented outcome was and was not attained, the relative impact of incentive 
size was determined. These techniques were employed to investigate the effect of incentive size both 
in actual dollar amount and as a proportion of total guaranteed compensation. 
 Of all the incentive sizes that were tested, only three treatments yielded significantly (α = 
.05) higher average incentive sizes in contract years when incentives were accomplished. All three of 
these treatments assessed incentives in terms of dollars, as opposed to proportions of total 
compensation. These three incentive types, which varied significantly with size, were season winning 
percentage t(14) = 2.570, p= .008, Non-BCS bowl participation t(633) = 2.229 , p=.026, and 12-win 
season t(103) = 2.833, p=.006. A fourth treatment, Top-25 ranking t(212) = 1.704, p=.090, is worth 
mention as it was statistically significant at an α level of .10. Table 8 displays information related to 
these significant mean comparisons. 
 A sizeable number of incentive types produced significant differences in mean showing 
smaller incentives sizes producing successful performance outcomes. The significantly smaller 
incentive sizes among successful contract years were present when comparing incentive size in 
dollars and relative incentive size. In total, two incentive types, Top-5 ranking t(42) = -5.58, p < 
.001) and 5 conference wins t(30) = -2.32, p=.027),  displayed significantly (α = .05) more 
performance success when fewer dollars were offered; A third type, 8-win season, also resulted in 
greater performance when less money was offered t(127) = -1.77, p=.080. Table 8 displays these 
findings. 
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 Four incentive types resulted in successful seasons among significantly smaller incentives 
when considered as a proportion of total guaranteed salary. Briefly, the incentive types that produce 
significant results with smaller relative incentive sizes were Conference Championship participation 
t(310) = -2.491, p=.013; Non-BCS bowl participation t(562) = -2.847, p=.005; Top-5 Ranking t(42) 
= -6.287, p< .001); and 5 conference wins t(30) = -2.370, p=.024.  Table 8 contains complete 
statistical information regarding these tests.  
Table 8 
Significant Incentive Size t-tests 
 Incentive Accomplished?   
 Yes No t df 














































































Note. * denotes t value significant at p < .05. Standard Deviations appear in parentheses below group 
means. 
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 Finally, a much greater number of incentives did not produce successful outcomes at 
significantly higher monetary offerings, either in dollars or in proportion to total compensation. 
Eighteen incentive types resulted in no significant difference in actual dollar offerings between 
successful and unsuccessful outcomes. Likewise, eighteen incentives did not produce significant 
differences in relation to proportion of total guaranteed compensation that was offered as an 
outcome incentive. The non-significant p-scores for the t-tests performed across these incentive 
types are presented in Tables 9 (Incentive size in dollars) and 9 (Incentive size as proportion of total 
compensation). Complete outcomes of these statistical tests, including means, standard deviations, 
and t scores can be found in Appendix D. 
Table 9 
Non Significant Incentive Size in Dollars 
Incentive Size in Dollars t df p 
Conference Championship Participation 0.23 310 0.819 
Conference Championship Victory -1.29 157 0.2 
Non-BCS Bowl Victory 1.14 112 0.255 
BCS Bowl Participation 1.13 65 0.265 
BCS Bowl Victory 1 112 0.321 
National Championship Participation 0.46 231 0.643 
National Championship Victory -0.24 303 0.809 
National Coach of the Year -0.04 319 0.972 
Conference Coach of the Year -0.58 360 0.561 
7-win Season -1.36 63 0.18 
9-win Season -1.01 140 0.315 
10-win Season 0.23 138 0.819 
11-win Season -0.4 121 0.688 
Top-10 -1.24 57 0.221 
Top-15 0.45 41 0.653 
Top-20 -0.02 47 0.988 
6 Conference win -1.29 27 0.21 
7 Conference wins -0.44 20 0.662 
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Table 10 
Non Significant Relative Incentive Size 
Incentive Size as Proportion of Total 
Compensation t df p 
National Championship Participation -1.76 231 0.079 
8-win Season -1.68 131 0.095 
Non-BCS Bowl Victory -1.58 112 .116 
12-win Season 1.47 103 0.146 
7-win Season -1.40 82 0.165 
Winning Percentage -1.45 14 0.169 
9-win Season -1.25 140 0.212 
10-win Season -0.10 138 0.212 
11-win Season -1.14 121 0.212 
National Coach of the Year -0.82 319 0.411 
7 Conference wins -0.78 20 0.444 
National Championship Victory -0.59 303 0.556 
Top 25 -0.58 48 0.563 
Top-20 -0.56 47 0.576 
Top-15 0.46 2 0.687 
6 Conference win -0.04 27 0.687 
BCS Bowl Victory -0.31 112 0.759 
Conference Coach of the Year 0.09 360 0.929 
 
Correlation analysis was used to investigate the effect of incentive size on APR and GSR. Because 
the academic metrics are continuous variables any changes in their size can be tracked alongside 
relative changes in incentives size. As Table 11 demonstrates, no significant correlation was found 
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between increases in incentive size and levels of APR or GSR. The Pearson Correlation coefficient 
for GSR and APR were r(204) = .051, p =.798 and r(133) = .022, p =.467, respectively, which both 
represent very low levels of non-significant correlation. Graphical representations of these 
correlation tests can be found in Appendix C. 
Table 11 
Academic Incentive Size in Dollars 
 Academic Outcome N 




Academic Incentive Size (Dollars) GSR .051 206 
 APR .022 135 
 
4. Supplemental Results 
 
Table 12 displays rankings of each conference in the average number of incentives that 
schools within that conference offered each season, the average number of total dollars that schools 
within the conference offered in incentives in each season, and the average proportion of total 
compensation that schools within each conference offered in incentives during each season. The 
column “n” in each table represents the total number of schools from the conference that was 
surveyed during the study. The “Maximum” figure represents the highest value of a given variable 
for each conference during the entirety of the study. 
 
Table 12 
Average Incentive Frequency and Size by Conference 
Conference n Mean Maximum Mean  ($) Maximum ($) Mean (%) Maximum (%) 
PAC-12 72 12.38 22 818,578 3,025,000 81.0 180.7 
Big 12 102 9 18 711,382 2,222,666 54.8 261.5 
Big East 42 8.69 18 481,497 1,425,000 48.0 129.1 
ACC 67 7.93 14 660,878 1,725,000 43.4 110.6 
Mid-
American 
103 7.83 16 126,258 382,664 46.3 111.5 
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SEC 75 7.76 15 687,205 1,700,000 38.9 83.8 
Total 747 7.66 22 468,814 3,025,000 47.4 262.5 
C-USA 44 7.32 17 239,615 540,832 50.0 148.2 
Sun Belt 36 5.97 13 65,701 550,000 23.1 55.1 
Big Ten 82 5.88 15 68,7540 2,900,000 53.5 262.5 
WAC 65 4.97 9 133,990 628,947 28.8 95.6 
MWC 59 4.88 12 197,674 635,000 35.1 115.5 
 
Chi-Square tests were performed to determine whether the presence of each incentive type 
varied significantly across seasons and conferences. Table 13 displays the list of the incentive types 
that had significant chi-square results (α = .05) for conference and season variance. In all, twelve 
incentive types varied significantly in frequency across seasons and all twelve increased in frequency 
in later seasons. Twenty eight incentive types varied significantly in frequency across conferences. 
Table 13 displays the conferences in which each incentive type was more and least likely to appear 
during the study. The forth and fifth columns in Table 13 display the seasons during which each 
incentive type was most and least likely to occur across all FBS schools sampled. Conferences and 
seasons are displayed only for incentive types that varied significantly. 
Table 13 
Incentive Frequency by Conference and Season 







Non-BCS Bowl Participation  SEC WAC 2011 2002 
BCS Bowl Participation  PAC-12 WAC 2011 2002 
Conference Championship 
Victory  
WAC MWC 2011 2002 
Conference Coach of the Year  MAC BIG 10 2012 2002 
National Coach of the Year PAC-12 C-USA 2012 2002 
Conference Championship 
Participation  
SEC WAC 2012 2002 
National Championship 
Victory  
BIG 10 MAC X X 
Graduation Rate  PAC-12 WAC X X 
National Championship 
Participation  
SEC MAC X X 
Top 25 MWC SEC X X 
Academic Progress Rate  PAC-12 BIG 12 2012 2004 
Top-10  PAC-12 MAC X X 
9-win Season  PAC-12 WAC X X 
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10-win Season  PAC-12 SEC X X 
8-win Season  PAC-12 BIG 10 X X 
11-win Season  PAC-12 BIG 10 X X 
Non-BCS Bowl Victory  MAC BIG 10 2012 2002 
BCS Bowl Victory  MAC BIG 10 2012 2002 
12-win Season  PAC-12 BIG 10 X X 
7-win Season  PAC-12 BIG 10 X X 
Top-20  ACC MAC X X 
Top-5  ACC MAC X X 
Top-15  ACC MAC X X 
5 Conference wins ACC PAC-12 X X 
6 Conference wins ACC PAC-12 X X 
7 Conference wins ACC MAC X X 
8 Conference wins  ACC MAC X X 
Winning Percentage C-USA BIG 12 X X 
Second APR X X 2012 2004 
Third APR  X X 2011 2006 
Fourth APR  X X 2012 2006 
 
Total Compensation v. Incentive Presence, Size, and Proportion 
Bivariate correlation analysis was used to determine the level of correlation between total 
compensation and incentive frequency and size within contract years. Table 14 shows the results of 
these correlation tests. A significant correlation  r(745) = .657, p <.001 was found between total 
compensation and the total amount an institution offered in incentives during a contract year. A 
graphical display of this correlation is featured in Graph 1. Statistically significant correlation was 
also found r(745) = .256, p < .001 between total guaranteed compensation and the total number of 
incentives that an institution offered during a contract year, as is displayed in Graph 2. The 
relationship between total compensation and relative incentive size, however, was not statistically 
significant r(745)=-.005, p = .889 and possessed a slightly negative correlation. This nonsignificant 
correlation is displayed in Graph 3. 
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Table 14 
Incentive Attributes vs. Total Compensation 
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Graph 2 
Regression: Total Compensation vs. Total Incentives Offered 
 
Graph 3 
Regression: Total Compensation vs. Total Relative Incentive Offerings 
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Total Compensation vs. Win Percentage 
The data collected in this study lent itself to one final test not related to incentive clauses; a 
correlation analysis of total compensation and season winning percentage for each of the 747 
contract years surveyed. This analysis revealed a significant, albeit weak, positive correlation r(745) = 












Regression: Total Compensation v. Season Win Percentage 
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION 
1. Summary 
 The results of this study are intended to provide insight related to four critical dimensions of 
incentive clauses within FBS head coach contracts. First, descriptive statistics illuminate the overall 
frequency and size of each incentive clause type during the course of 11 seasons. Next, chi-square 
analysis was used to determine whether and how the frequency of incentive types varied over time 
and between athletic conferences. More centrally to the purpose of this study, contractual content 
analysis was then used to compare incentive clause attributes to attained athletic and academic 
performance outcomes during 747 contract years. By comparing performance achievement levels 
across contract years, among athletic conferences, and through time, this study then analyzed the 
effect of incentive clause presence and size on the likelihood of achieving desired performance 
outcomes. The following section will interpret the results of these calculations and tests to provide 
useful conclusions regarding each of these investigated topics. 
 
2. Incentive Clause Attributes 
Incentive Prevalence 
 The results of this study reveal that an overwhelming majority of contract years (702 out of 
747) contained at least one incentive type that was included in this study. In response to Research 
Question 1, the most common incentive types dealt with bowl participation, either BCS or non-
BCS. These incentive types appeared in more than half of all contract years. Next most frequently 
occurring were incentives for conference championship victories and conference coach of the year 
recognition achievement, which both appeared in at least half of the contract years that offered at 
least one incentive. Conference championships game participation occurred slightly least frequently 
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(303 contract years), but it should be noted that this result is likely explained by the absence of 
divisions and conference championship games in some athletic conferences during the seasons of 
the study. If the results were to account for only seasons in which conferences either contained 
divisions or hosted conference championship games, the proportion of contract years that featured a 
conference championship game or division championship incentive would likely be considerably 
higher. As for explaining the relative frequency of these incentives compared to the least frequently 
appearing incentives (ex: conference wins, Top 5, Top 15), one theoretical explanation is that bowl 
appearances, division titles, and conference coach of the year awards are more realistic goals for any 
football team in any season, regardless of conference affiliation or historical success. Unlike national 
awards or national ranking outcomes, these goals can be achieved even within the relatively modest 
confines of lower-tiered athletic conferences. As for why conference-win incentives, which arguably 
are also achievable regardless of conference, are not more prominent, it may be that other incentives 
act as practical proxies for conference success or that conference win total incentives are simply not 
the preferred method of constructing incentives. These findings support research by Inoue (2011), 
who found nearly 93% of FBS head coaching contracts in 2006 contained at least some form of 
incentive clause. Similar to these results, Inoue found that the most frequent and highly incented 
clauses regarded on-field athletic success. 
 Purely academic results, APR and GSR, appeared about as frequently as incentives related to 
national championship activity and national rankings. It is important to remember that while the 
frequency figures cover the entire 11-season span of the study, APR and GSR were not regularly 
accounted for until around 2004. Also, a significant trend of increased APR and GSR incentive 
presence was found over time. Therefore, it is probably less likely that APR and GSR incentives are 
more often included alongside national ranking or national championship incentives. Rather, APR 
and GSR incentives became increasingly more common over time and were included in contracts 
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from institutions at all levels. The results of this study do not indicate a cause of increased academic 
incentives, but it is possible that this trend was motivated by scrutiny regarding the 
commercialization of college football and a desire to emphasize academic success by the same 
means as athletic performance (Inoue, 2011). 
 The data also convey significant trends of increased incentive frequency and size overall over 
time. The average contract year in 2002 contained just over 4.6 incentives and offered approximately 
$185,000 in incentives. Those numbers are in contrast to the average 2012 contract year with 
featured 9.2 incentives and offered more than $712,000 in incentives. Incentive offering also grew 
relative to total compensation over time from 30.8% in 2002 to a height of 53.7% in 2010. Trends in 
the final years of the study, especially 2010-2012, suggest that incentive size and frequency may be 
leveling off to near equilibrium but the overall trends of increase throughout the study are clear. 
 The rate of incentive presence found in this study also corresponds closely to the 92.9% rate 
that Inoue found in 2010 when studying football coaching contracts. Without addressing incentive 
effectiveness, the clear trend in incentive frequency bolsters the case of institutional isomorphism in 
coaching contracts. Regardless of whether the incentive clauses are objectively beneficial to each 
actor, they have definitely become an industry norm over time. 
Incentive Size 
 Research Question 2 asked which incentive types were mostly highly incented monetarily. 
Not surprisingly, in terms of actual dollars, the most valuable incentives coincided with the highest 
levels of achievement. Specially, these performance outcomes were national titles ($229,587), 
national championship appearances ($178,893), Top 5 rankings ($152,175), and BCS bowl 
participation ($85,283). Relative to total compensation, the most valuable incentive types were BCS 
bowl participation (9.0%), national titles (8.1%), conference championship wins (5.4%) and national 
championship participation (4.2%). An explanation as for why these incentive types are not ordered 
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identically between size metrics is not clear. It does make intuitive sense that any incentive for 
nationally recognized success would accompany a sizeable dollar amount. It could be that, while 
BCS-conference schools with large total compensation did not distinguish significantly between elite 
national success and mere premier-bowl-level success, schools in smaller conferences may have 
forgone the highest incentive types and incented BCS bowl participation significantly. This 
explanation is rational given the lack of opportunity for even the best non-BCS schools to compete 
for national titles and the relatively lower total compensations among these schools. 
The results of this study echo past research that also found on-field athletic performance to 
be the most highly incented type of outcome (Inoue, 2011). From a theoretical perspective, this 
finding might suggest that disparate incentives sizes create implicit signals of what goals should be 
prioritized by agents (Baker, 1992). Also, if one subscribes to the theory that institutional 
isomorphism allows actors to borrow judgments regarding prioritization from fellow actors, then the 
higher penchant on athletic performance has likely been adopted as an institutional norm (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983). 
 
3. Effect of Incentive Presence 
Research questions 3 and 4 address the effect of athletically related or academically related 
incentives on athletic or academic performance during a contract year. Overall, the answer to these 
questions based on the results is likely that no significant effect exists. Although there were 
significant increases in the frequency of performance success among some incentive types 
(Conference championship participation, APR, Non BCS bowl participation, National 
championship participation, Conference Coach of the Year, Top 5, and Top 10) there were also 
significant decreases in success among others (Non BCS bowl win, 11-win season, and Top 25) and 
more commonly no significant differences in performance outcomes for 16 incentive types, 
including GSR. So, while the results do not suggest a conclusion that incentive presence increases 
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the likelihood of increased performance success, is there any way of explaining the significant results 
that were found? Most likely not, as the types of incentives which resulted in significant increases 
and decreases in success cannot be intuitively linked to conference types. It is hard to imagine that, 
while incenting Non BCS Bowl participation increases the likelihood of attainment, the opposite is 
true of a Non BCS bowl victory. It is conceivable that only elite schools might be willing to incent a 
Top 5 finish or national championship participation, thereby selecting for successful outcomes. If 
this theory is applied to the significant decrease in success coinciding with Top 25 incentives it 
would suggest that too many schools that are not realistic Top 25 contenders were incenting the 
result. It should be recognized that this theory is reversing the course of causation from incentives 
motivating success to success motivating or facilitating incentives. This study is not intended to 
assess causation, but merely make conclusions about the connection between incentive clauses and 
success, which as far as incentive presence appear weak. 
The lack of significant difference in performance between schools that did and did not 
incent outcomes is perhaps the strongest result of the study in favor of institutional isomorphism 
and agency in coaching contracts. The judgment of whether to include an incentive type is far less 
nuanced than determining the proper value of an incentive. Regardless of which party bargained for 
the inclusion of a performance incentive, the lack of significant effect from incentive presence 
across the entire timeframe of the study suggests that the choice of inclusion was often not tied to a 
reasonable expectation of successful performance. Rather, incentive inclusion may have been a 
function of attaining esteem within the market (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) or it may have been a 
means for schools to explicitly signal to coaches which aspects of their jobs should be most highly 
prioritized (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). By agreeing on which incentive clauses should be included 
and excluded within a contract, schools and coaches were theoretically memorializing agreements 
regarding the way in which the coach as an agent would perform work for his principal. The lack of 
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significant improvement in performance among incented contract years suggests that these 
conversations either ought to be more direct or that the message is not being successfully acted 
upon. 
 
4. Effect of Incentive Size 
 The lack of significant differences in incentive sizes of successful and unsuccessful 
performance outcomes suggests that incentive size does not produce a significant effect on incentive 
completion. Eighteen incentive types produced no significant mean difference in incentive size 
between performance outcomes. Incentive success was also more commonly associated with 
significantly lower incentive sizes than larger incentive amounts. These trends were found both 
when assessing incentive size in dollars and relative to total guaranteed compensation. This trend, or 
lack thereof, is potentially more striking than the lack of significant difference between contract 
years that did and did not offer performance incentives because there is less reason to believe an 
inherent difference exists between institutions in either performance group. In other words, while 
performance differences in earlier tests may be explained by an underlying attribute that 
differentiates schools that offer incentives and those that don’t for particular performance 
outcomes, it is harder to imagine any such underlying institutional characteristics that distinguish 
schools that offer larger or smaller incentives both in real and relative size. 
More likely, the nonsignificant mean differences in incentive size suggest that performance 
outcomes are not greatly affected by incentive size, either real or relative. The relative effect of 
incentive size might be approximated through multiple regression analysis incorporating several 
other potential performance-impacting factors (a method far beyond the scope of this study), but 
the results of this study conclude that incentive size is not a significant contributor to performance 
success. Again, the lack of significant difference was found among both athletic and academic 
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incentives, perhaps suggesting that whatever methods schools employ to determine proper incentive 
size are currently applied to both incentive types. 
This study is not intended to illuminate the means by which schools determine proper 
incentive offering sizes. The results do suggest that sizes have not been selected with the primary 
goal of motivating otherwise less-likely outcomes. Applying the logic of agency theory, the results of 
this study advise that current values have been ill-crafted if intended to augment agent performance. 
One might therefore consider current clauses inefficient as incentives, and are perhaps better 
devised as rewards or deferred compensation mechanisms. Other than noting the lack of overall 
success elicited by incentive mechanisms, this study is not highly amendable to assess the effect of 
incentive offerings on agent behavior. As the descriptive statistics indicated, the most highly 
incented outcomes often tended to be the most prestigious while the most often completed 
outcomes were those that could literally be completed most often. One additional aspect of interest 
regarding the effect of incentive size would be its potential to augment or corrupt agent behavior 
(Jensen, Murphy & Wruck, 2004). Although the results of this study do not conclusively show a 
strong trend of observed outcomes toward high-money incentives, additional research might be 
useful in gauging the effect of incentive offerings on agent motivation. 
 
5. Supplemental Results 
Overall incentive completion percentages, displayed in Table 1 above, may be read to imply 
higher completion rates among more modest outcome types. Also, the most highly completed goals 
were those that numerous institutions could complete within any given season. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, Winning percentage, APR, non-BCS bowl participation, and GSR incentives appeared 
within the top five. With the exemption of winning percentage, which was a less-frequently 
appearing incentive overall, these incentives could theoretically be completed by nearly half of FBS 
teams if not more. However, APR and GSR outcomes are not mutually exclusive between teams, as 
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is winning a game. Thus, all schools could potentially complete all academic goals included in this 
study in every contract year. Non-BCS bowl participation, similarly, is far from rare in modern FBS 
football. With more than 30 bowl games annually and close to 60 teams competing, a large portion 
of FBS schools attains bowl participation regularly. This is not to say that bowl participation is not a 
sign of athletic success, but merely aids to explain why incentive completion rates may differ as they 
do. Contrast these results with the incentive types garnering the lowest completion percentages — 
national titles, BCS bowl wins, and National Coach of the Year awards — which are generally 
received by only one or a handful of teams or coaches each season. 
Table 12, which displays rankings of each conference in the average number of incentives 
that schools within that conference offered each season, the average number of total dollars that 
schools within the conference offered in incentives in each season, and the average proportion of 
total compensation that schools within each conference offered in incentives during each season, are 
interesting in themselves but not ripe for conclusive analysis. Without much more thorough study, it 
is almost impossible to suggest why teams within each conference behave as they do relative to 
incentives. Yet, there may be good reason to believe that schools within each athletic conference are 
impacted by the actions of their rivals. This hypothesis would suggest that conferences become 
partially distinct institutions with their own attitudes and customs toward incentive compensation. 
The clear trend among conferences regarding preferred incentive structures is potential evidence of 
coercive, mimetic, or normative isomorphism (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983). Three examples in 
particular highlight this possibility. First, in addition to offering to most incentives on average, 
schools in the PAC-12 also offered, by far, the most academic incentives. It may be that each of 
these schools is independently committed to academic success and the incentive offerings are a way 
to illustrate that dedication. Alternatively, each PAC-12 school may be structuring its incentive 
behavior relative to football coaches in a similar manner as not to fall behind in any area of 
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competition. As all of the schools within the conference are competing on relatively even ground 
and competing for the same rewards, any institution which does not follow institutional logic risks 
following behind the curve in the quest to attain success. In this case, if a school were not to incent 
academic outcomes, it may or may not result in a less academically viable football team. Though the 
outcome of this proposition is uncertain for any given actor, the practice of also offering academic 
incentives might appear less risky (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983).  
A second example is the vigor with which schools in the Big Ten incent elite athletic 
achievement. Although schools in this conference offered few total incentives compared to most 
leagues, when Big Ten schools do incent performance it’s typically high-level success, such as 
national championships. One explanation is that Big Ten administrators believe that only grandiose 
incentives are effective in motivating performance, a theory typically approached disapprovingly in 
literature (Healy, 1985). Another is that Big Ten schools’ behavior is a case of coercive isomorphism, 
wherein each school is using high-level incentives to signal both its ability to pay big-money bonuses 
as well as its intention of realistically competing for national acclaim (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983). In 
the case of coercive isomorphism, the decision among Big Ten schools to offer an incentive would 
not be grounded in the principal-agent rationale of motivating performance and aligning interests so 
much as it would be about not being the one school that sticks out by not appearing as a legitimate 
competitor.  
The final example of potential isomorphism is the curious trend among schools in the ACC 
to offer incentives attached to distinct win conditions. Unlike most conferences, ACC schools 
appeared incredibly likely to incent and/or reward a particular number of conference or regular 
season wins. The behavior is not necessarily curious as a means of incenting success, as winning 
games and achieving other goals are directly aligned. Rather, the collective trend is peculiar because 
win outcome incentives were such a rare construction overall. It would be perhaps more 
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understandable and less noteworthy if a single school developed unique incentive constructions, as 
incentives can be drafted individually and each school can customize them to fit any desire. 
However, that ACC schools were, as a group, using win outcome incentives, an undoubtedly 
deliberate construction, significantly more than schools in any other conference reeks of 
isomorphism within the conference. 
Potentially isomorphic behavior was not constrained to athletic conferences within this 
study. Table 13 suggests many incentives types have become significantly more common across all 
schools over the years of this study. Any casual observer of college football or coaching employment 
terms would likely not be shocked by this trend. In fact, the practice of increased incentive offerings 
was in part a motivating factor for conducting this study. Even among nonsignificant Chi-square 
tests, the residual outcomes suggested that each incentive type was more likely to appear in later 
seasons. There are likely countless reasons for this trend. One might wager the strongest factors are 
increased accessibility of contract information and greater bargaining power among coaches. Also, 
specifically among public schools, which publish compensation information, there may be sensitivity 
about offering high base salaries to coaches that in turn results in more money being offered in 
incentives. Regardless of the causes, larger quantities of incentives within contracts, a trend that itself 
may have leveled-off and warrants further investigation, appears to have become an industry norm. 
This finding directly supports a wealth of literature on the subject of coaching contracts (Brady et. 
al., 2012; Inoue, 2011; Reynolds, 2012; Wilson et. al., 2011). The single original contribution this 
study might make regarding the prevalence of incentives is a potential leveling-off in incentive 
frequency in since 2010. While the data do not convey significant decreases in incentive prevalence 
in recent years, and any changes in trajectory could be due to newer, smaller FBS members, the 
trend of significant growth has certainly tapered. 
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A few of the most interesting results of this study may be found in the regression analyses 
comparing descriptive attributes of incentives to total compensation. Simply stated, these analyses 
suggest that greater numbers of incentives are offered as total compensation rises and that the total 
dollars offered in incentives increases along with total compensation each contract year. The results 
also show that, regardless of the amount in dollars offered, incentive offerings did not account for 
significantly more or less money relative to total compensation as compensation level changed. The 
first two of these results likely suggest that schools paying greater salaries also offer more and larger 
incentives and/or more and larger incentives appeared over time as FBS compensation increased. 
Both of these conclusions, which are not mutually exclusive, are supported by other findings within 
this study. But perhaps most interesting, even as compensation rose, incentive frequency rose, and 
total incentive dollars rose, the proportion of incentive offering to total compensation did not vary 
significantly. So, while schools may have placed increased importance on the inclusion and size of 
incentive clauses, it does not appear that incentive offering outpaced or trailed the growth of 
compensation overall. Likewise, this result might suggest that, even across large schools with 
sizeable compensation practices and small schools with comparatively more modest budgets, 
institutions generally committed similar proportions of their total compensation to incentive clauses. 
This particular finding was among the most unexpected and cannot be squarely reconciled with past 
literature, as very little has previously been written about the proportion of incentive offerings 
compared to total guaranteed compensation (Inoue, 2011; Wilson, 2011). 
 
6. Recommendations 
 In total, this study illustrates that incentive presence and size does not significantly impact 
athletic or academic performance. To the extent that the results can inform decisions, the best 
course of action for coaches, administrators, and other involved parties may be one of thoughtful 
inaction. If anything, this study has concluded that while incentives have undoubtedly increased in 
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frequency and size since 2002, there is no strong evidence that incentives, especially large incentives, 
are effective in creating positive outcomes. 
 The cost of offering incentives should not be overstated. Although unfulfilled incentives will 
obviously go unpaid, incentives must still be budgeted for in the contingency that successful results 
will be attained. The noticeably regimented size of incentive payments for various performance goals 
observed throughout the course of this study suggests that most incentive amounts are not related 
to potential revenue derived from their fulfillment. Perhaps further investigation is needed to 
determine the likely increase in revenue that programs can expect from success in each incentive 
area, so that incentive sizes may be adjusted accordingly. Regardless, there is cause to believe that 
even fulfilled incentive payments may not be money well spent. The results of this study suggest that 
even among contract years where success was attained, it is no more likely to occur for coaches who 
were incented than those that were not for most performance types. Therefore, it may be that 
success will be attained at significant similar levels even if would-be incentive payments were 
reallocated to other areas of a team’s budget. 
 
7. Further Research 
 The potential for further research in this area is vast. In addition to further investigating and 
describing the relationship between incentive clauses and results, qualitative research exploring the 
thoughts and opinions of decision makers regarding incentives would be a strong contribution. 
Studies investigating the significant determinants of academic and athletic success in FBS football 
would also be illuminating for attempts to wisely allocate sparse resources. Finally, it might be of 
note to track the effect of incentives along with other contract attributes such as remaining term and 
opportunities for renegotiation. If one subscribes to the theory that contractual agreements between 
coaches and institutions immortalize both parties’ expectations and act as motivators, including 
more contractual elements in further studies could better explain a possible link.
	   	  
	   58	  
 







Victory Incentive Present? 
No Yes   
Yes 512 77 2.07 .151 
 (-.2) (.6)   
No 144 14   
 
 (.4) (-1.2)   
 BCS Bowl Participation 
Incentive Present? 
    
 Yes 581 46 1.59 .207 
  (-.1) (.5)   
 No 115 5   
  (.3) (-1.1)   
 BCS Bowl Victory 
Incentive Present? 
    
 Yes 112 2 1.63 .201 
  (.2) (-1.2)   
 No 606 27   
  (-.1) (.5)   
 National Championship 
Victory Incentive Present? 
    
 Yes 302 3 .21 .645 
  (.0) (-.4)   
 No 436 6   
  (.0) (.3)   
 National Coach of the 
Year Incentive Present? 
    
 Yes 316 6 .06 .806 
  (.0) (-.2)   
 No 416 9   
  (.0) (.2)   
 7-win Season Incentive 
Present? 
    
 Yes 46 38 2.14 .144 
  (1.0) (-.9)   
 No 307 356   
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  (-.4) (.3)   
 8-win Season Incentive 
Present? 
    
 Yes 81 52 .01 .918 
  (.1) (-.1)   
 No 371 243   
  (.0) (.0)   
 9-win Season Incentive 
Present? 
    
 Yes 106 36 .34 .561 
  (.3) (-.4)   
 No 437 168   
  (-.1) (.2)   
 10-win Season Incentive 
Present? 
    
 Yes 118 22 .72 .397 
  (.3) (-.7)   
 No 493 114   
  (-.2) (.3)   
 12-win Season Incentive 
Present? 
    
 Yes 98 7 .03 .865 
  (.0) (.2)   
 No 602 40   
  (.0) (-.1)   
 Top-15 Incentive Present?     
 Yes 40 3 1.67 .196 
  (.5) (-1.2)   
 No 606 98   
  (-.1) (.3)   
 Top-20 Incentive Present?     
 Yes 39 10 .27 .603 
  (-.2) (.5)   
 No 576 122   
  (.1) (-.1)   
 5 Conference wins 
Incentive Present? 
    
 Yes 23 10 1.47 .225 
  (.8) (-.9)   
 No 422 292   
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  (-.2) (.2)   
 6 Conference wins 
Incentive Present? 
    
 Yes 25 4 2.07 .150 
  (.7) (-1.2)   
 No 534 184   
  (-.1) (.2)   
 7 Conference wins 
Incentive Present? 
    
 Yes 21 1 1.63 .202 
  (.5) (-1.2)   
 No 623 102   
  (-.1) (.2)   
 8 Conference wins 
Incentive Present? 
    
 Yes 22 0 1.15 .284 
  (.2) (-1.0)   
 No 689 36   
  (.0) (.2)   
 
	   	  
	   61	  
 
APPENDIX B: Win Incentive Presence Not Significant 
 
 Incentive Present?   
 Yes No t df 
Number of Conference 






Number of Conference 






Number of Conference 






Number of Conference 
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APPENDIX C: GSR Incentive Presence and Academic Incentive Size Not Significant 
 
 Incentive Present?   









 Academic Outcome N 
Academic Incentive Size (Dollars)  r  
 GSR .051 206 
 APR .022 135 
GSR p = .467, APR p = .798 
 
Graph 
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Graph 
Regression: Size of GSR Incentive vs. Season GSR Score 
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 Yes No t df 
Size of Conference Championship Participation 
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APPENDIX E: Survey Instrument 
 
Q1 Institution? 
 North Carolina 








 Arizona State 
 Arkansas 
 Arkansas State 
 California 
 Fresno State 
 San Diego State 
 San Jose State 
 UCLA 
 Colorado 
 Colorado State 
 Connecticut 
 Florida International 
 Florida 
 Florida Atlantic 
 Florida State 
 South Florida 
 Central Florida 
 Georgia 
 Georgia Tech 
 Hawaii 
 Boise State 
 Idaho 
 Illinois 
 Northern Illinois 




 Iowa State 
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 Kansas 




 Louisiana Tech 




 Central Michigan 
 Eastern Michigan 
 Michigan 
 Michigan State 
 Western Michigan 
 Minnesota 
 Mississippi 
 Mississippi State 






 New Mexico 
 New Mexico State 
 Army 
 Buffalo 
 East Carolina 
 Akron 
 Bowling Green 
 Cincinnati 
 Kent State 
 Miami (OH) 
 Ohio 
 Ohio State 
 Toledo 
 Oklahoma 
 Oklahoma State 
 Oregon 
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 Oregon State 




 South Carolina 
 Memphis 
 Middle Tennessee State 
 Tennessee 
 Houston 
 North Texas 
 Texas 
 Texas A&M 
 Texas State 




 Utah State 
 Virginia Tech 
 Washington 
 Washington State 
 Marshall 




Q2 Head Coach? 
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Q167 Athletic Conference 
 ACC 
 Big 10 
 Big 12 




 Sun Belt 
 C-USA 
 Mountain West 
 Western Athletic Conference 
 
Q4 Base Salary (Dollars) 
______ In Dollars 
 
Q16 Total Compensation 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If Winning Percentage Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q161 Winning Percentage Incentive Threshold? 
______ Percent 
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Answer If Winning Percentage Incentive? Yes Is Selected 
Q6 Size of Winning Percentage Incentive? 
______ In Dollars 
 
Q7 Season Winning Percentage? 
______ Click to write Choice 1 
 
Answer If Winning Percentage Incentive? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If Conference Championship Participation Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q18 Size of Conference Championship Participation Incentive? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If Conference Championship Participation Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If Conference Championship Victory Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q11 Size of Conference Championship Victory Incentive? 
______ In Dollars 
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Answer If Conference Championship Victory Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q126 APR Incentive Threshold? 
______ APR 
 
Answer If APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q13 Size of APR Incentive 
______ In Dollars 
 
Q14 Season APR? 
______ APR Score 
 
Answer If APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 




Answer If APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 




Answer If Second APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q128 Second APR Incentive Threshold? 
______ APR 
 
Answer If Second APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q129 Second APR Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 
Answer If Third APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
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Answer If Second APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 




Answer If Third APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q133 Third Incentive Threshold? 
______ APR 
 
Answer If Third APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q134 Third APR Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 
Answer If Third APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 




Answer If Third APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 




Answer If Fourth APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q141 Fourth Incentive Threshold? 
______ APR 
 
Answer If Fourth APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q142 Fourth APR Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 
Answer If Fourth APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 




Answer If Fourth APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
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Answer If Fifth APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q171 Fifth APR Incentive Threshold 
______ APR 
 
Answer If Fifth APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q172 Fifth APR Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 
Answer If Fifth APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If Second Graduation Rate Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q145 Graduation Rate Incentive Threshold 
______ Graduation Rate 
 
Answer If Graduation Rate Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q47 Graduation Rate Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 
Q48 Team Graduation Rate? 
______ Percent 
 
Answer If Graduation Rate Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 




Answer If Second Graduation Rate Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 




Answer If Second Graduation Rate Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q147 Second Graduation Rate Incentive Threshold 
______ Graduation Rate 
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Answer If Second Graduation Rate Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q148 Second Graduation Rate Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 
Answer If Second Graduation Rate Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 




Answer If Second Graduation Rate Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 




Answer If Third Graduation Rate Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q152 Third Graduation Rate Incentive Threshold 
______ Graduation Rate 
 
Answer If Third Graduation Rate Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q153 Third Graduation Rate Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 
Answer If Third Graduation Rate Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 




Answer If Third Graduation Rate Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 




Answer If Fourth Graduation Rate Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q157 Fourth Graduation Rate Incentive Threshold 
______ Graduation Rate 
 
Answer If Fourth Graduation Rate Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q158 Fourth Graduation Rate Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
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Answer If Fifth Graduation Rate Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 




Answer If Fifth Graduation Rate Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 




Answer If Fifth Graduation Rate Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q175 Fifth Graduation Rate Incentive Threshold 
______ Graduation Rate 
 
Answer If Fifth Graduation Rate Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q176 Fifth Graduation Rate Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 
Answer If Fourth Graduation Rate Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If Non-BCS Bowl Participation Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q23 Non-BCS Bowl Participation Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If Non-BCS Bowl Participation Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








	   	  
	   76	  
Answer If Non-BCS Bowl Victory Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q27 Non-BCS Bowl Victory Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If Non-BCS Bowl Victory Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If BCS Bowl Participation Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q31 BCS Bowl Participation Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If BCS Bowl Participation Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If BCS Bowl Victory Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q35 BCS Bowl Victory Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
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Answer If BCS Bowl Victory Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 




Answer If Fourth APR Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If National Championship Participation Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q39 National Championship Participation Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If National Championship Participation Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If National Championship Victory Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q43 National Championship Victory Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If National Championship Victory Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
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Answer If National Coach of the Year Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q51 National Coach of the Year Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If National Coach of the Year Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If Conference Coach of the Year Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q55 Conference Coach of the Year Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If Conference Coach of the Year Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Q162 Number of Team Wins 
______ Wins 
 
	   	  
	   79	  
Answer If 7-win Season Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q63 7-win Season Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If 7-win Season Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If 8-win Season Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q67 8-win Season Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If 8-win Season Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If 9-win Season Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q71 9-win Season Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
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Answer If 9-win Season Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If 10-win Season Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q75 10-win Season Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If 10-win Season Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If 11-win Season Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q79 11-win Season Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If 11-win Season Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
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Answer If 12-win Season Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q83 12-win Season Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If 12-win Season Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If 13-win Season Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q87 13-win Season Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If 13-win Season Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If 14-win Season Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q91 14-win Season Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
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Answer If 14-win Season Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 




Q163 Final Ranking? 
______ AP Ranking 
 




Answer If Top 25 Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q59 Top 25 Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If Top 25 Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If Top-5 Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q95 Top-5 Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If Top-5 Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
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Answer If Top-10 Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q99 Top-10 Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If Top-10 Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If Top-15 Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q103 Top-15 Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If Top-15 Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If Top-20 Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q107 Top-20 Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
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Answer If Top-20 Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 




Q164 Number of Conference Wins 
______ Conference Wins 
 




Answer If 5 Conference wins Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q111 5 Conference wins Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If 5 Conference wins Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If 6 Conference wins Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q115 6 Conference wins Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
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Answer If 6 Conference wins Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If 7 Conference wins Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q119 7 Conference wins Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If 7 Conference wins Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 








Answer If 8 Conference wins Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 
Q123 8 Conference wins Incentive Size? 
______ In Dollars 
 




Answer If 8 Conference wins Incentive Present? Yes Is Selected 




Q166 Contract Season Notes? 
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2003 -11.16% 0.935 -$83,105 0.999 -1.37 0.879 
2004 -11.33% 0.91 -$115,256 0.978 -1.75 0.55 
2005 -11.64% 0.877 -$153,075 0.841 -1.89 0.384 
2006 -11.87% 0.852 -$179,339 0.645 -2.09 0.222 
2007 -17.97% 0.293 -$244,292 0.188 -3.06* 0.005 
2008 -21.40% 0.095 -$320,568* 0.016 -3.72* 0 
2009 -22.55% 0.061 -$378,725* 0.001 -4.16* 0 
2010 -22.83% 0.054 -$393,049* 0.001 -4.09* 0 
2011 -22.14% 0.071 -$492,677* 0 -4.66* 0 
2002 2012 -18.83% 0.216 -$526,567* 0 -4.60* 0 
2002 11.16% 0.935 $83,105 0.999 1.37 0.879 
2004 -0.17% 1 -$32,151 1 -0.38 1 
2005 -0.49% 1 -$69,970 0.999 -0.53 1 
2006 -0.72% 1 -$96,234 0.989 -0.72 0.997 
2007 -6.81% 0.996 -$161,187 0.727 -1.70 0.467 
2008 -10.24% 0.919 -$237,464 0.169 -2.36 0.066 
2009 -11.39% 0.85 -$295,620* 0.024 -2.79* 0.01 
2010 -11.67% 0.829 -$309,944* 0.014 -2.72* 0.014 
2011 -10.99% 0.877 -$409,572* 0 -3.29* 0.001 
2003 2012 -7.68% 0.988 -$443,462* 0 -3.24* 0.001 
2002 11.33% 0.91 $115,256 0.978 1.75 0.55 
2003 0.17% 1 $32,151 1 0.38 1 
2005 -0.32% 1 -$37,818 1 -0.15 1 
2006 -0.55% 1 -$64,083 0.999 -0.34 1 
2007 -6.65% 0.995 -$129,036 0.887 -1.32 0.755 
2008 -10.07% 0.9 -$205,312 0.29 -1.98 0.173 
2009 -11.22% 0.818 -$263,469* 0.048 -2.41* 0.032 
2010 -11.50% 0.794 -$277,793* 0.027 -2.34* 0.043 
2011 -10.82% 0.85 -$377,421* 0 -2.91* 0.003 
2004 2012 -7.51% 0.985 -$411,311* 0 -2.86* 0.003 
2002 11.64% 0.877 $153,075 0.841 1.89 0.384 
2003 0.49% 1 $69,970 0.999 0.53 1 
2004 0.32% 1 $37,818 1 0.15 1 
2006 -0.23% 1 -$26,264 1 -0.20 1 
2007 -6.33% 0.995 -$91,218 0.986 -1.17 0.841 
2008 -9.76% 0.899 -$167,494 0.556 -1.83 0.226 
2009 -10.90% 0.814 -$225,651 0.135 -2.26* 0.044 
2010 -11.18% 0.789 -$239,975 0.083 -2.20 0.059 
2005 
2011 -10.50% 0.847 -$339,603* 0.001 -2.76* 0.003 
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 2012 -7.19% 0.986 -$373,492* 0 -2.71* 0.004 
2002 11.87% 0.852 $179,339 0.645 2.09 0.222 
2003 0.72% 1 $96,234 0.989 0.72 0.997 
2004 0.55% 1 $64,083 0.999 0.34 1 
2005 0.23% 1 $26,264 1 0.20 1 
2007 -6.10% 0.996 -$64,953 0.999 -0.97 0.94 
2008 -9.53% 0.903 -$141,230 0.763 -1.64 0.363 
2009 -10.67% 0.817 -$199,386 0.26 -2.07 0.085 
2010 -10.95% 0.792 -$213,711 0.173 -2.00 0.111 
2011 -10.27% 0.851 -313,338* 0.003 -2.57* 0.008 
2006 2012 -6.96% 0.988 -347,228* 0 -2.52* 0.009 
2002 17.97% 0.293 $244,292 0.188 3.06* 0.005 
2003 6.81% 0.996 $161,187 0.727 1.70 0.467 
2004 6.65% 0.995 $129,036 0.887 1.32 0.755 
2005 6.33% 0.995 $91,218 0.986 1.17 0.841 
2006 6.10% 0.996 $64,953 0.999 0.97 0.94 
2008 -3.43% 1 -$76,277 0.996 -0.66 0.997 
2009 -4.57% 1 -$134,433 0.814 -1.10 0.877 
2010 -4.85% 0.999 -$148,758 0.7 -1.03 0.916 
2011 -4.17% 1 -$248,386 0.052 -1.60 0.402 
2007 2012 -0.86% 1 -$282,275* 0.01 -1.54 0.435 
2002 21.40% 0.095 $320,568* 0.016 3.72* 0 
2003 10.24% 0.919 $237,464 0.169 2.36 0.066 
2004 10.07% 0.9 $205,312 0.29 1.98 0.173 
2005 9.76% 0.899 $167,494 0.556 1.83 0.226 
2006 9.53% 0.903 $141,230 0.763 1.64 0.363 
2007 3.43% 1 $76,277 0.996 0.66 0.997 
2009 -1.15% 1 -$58,157 1 -0.43 1 
2010 -1.43% 1 -$72,481 0.997 -0.37 1 
2011 -0.74% 1 -$172,109 0.485 -0.93 0.955 
2008 2012 2.57% 1 -$205,999 0.201 -0.88 0.967 
2002 22.55% 0.061 $378,725* 0.001 4.16* 0 
2003 11.39% 0.85 $295,620* 0.024 2.79* 0.01 
2004 11.22% 0.818 $263,469* 0.048 2.41* 0.032 
2005 10.90% 0.814 $225,651 0.135 2.26* 0.044 
2006 10.67% 0.817 $199,386 0.26 2.07 0.085 
2007 4.57% 1 $134,433 0.814 1.10 0.877 
2008 1.15% 1 $58,157 1 0.43 1 
2010 -0.28% 1 -$14,324 1 0.07 1 
2011 0.40% 1 -$113,953 0.928 -0.50 1 
2009 2012 3.71% 1 -$147,842 0.691 -0.45 1 
2002 22.83% 0.054 $393,049* 0.001 4.09* 0 
2003 11.67% 0.829 $309,944* 0.014 2.72* 0.014 
2004 11.50% 0.794 $277,793* 0.027 2.34* 0.043 
2005 11.18% 0.789 $239,975 0.083 2.20 0.059 
2006 10.95% 0.792 $213,711 0.173 2.00 0.111 
2007 4.85% 0.999 $148,758 0.7 1.03 0.916 
2010 
2008 1.43% 1 $72,481 0.997 0.37 1 
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2009 0.28% 1 $14,324 1 -0.07 1 
2011 0.68% 1 -$99,628 0.97 -0.57 0.999 
 
2012 3.99% 1 -$133,518 0.808 -0.52 1 
2002 22.14% 0.071 $492,677* 0 4.66* 0 
2003 10.99% 0.877 $409,572* 0 3.29* 0.001 
2004 10.82% 0.85 $377,421* 0 2.91* 0.003 
2005 10.50% 0.847 $339,603* 0.001 2.76* 0.003 
2006 10.27% 0.851 $313,338* 0.003 2.57* 0.008 
2007 4.17% 1 $248,386 0.052 1.60 0.402 
2008 0.74% 1 $172,109 0.485 0.93 0.955 
2009 -0.40% 1 $113,953 0.928 0.50 1 
2010 -0.68% 1 $99,628 0.97 0.57 0.999 
2011 2012 3.31% 1 -$33,889 1 0.05 1 
2002 18.83% 0.216 $526,567* 0 4.60* 0 
2003 7.68% 0.988 $443,462* 0 3.24* 0.001 
2004 7.51% 0.985 $411,311* 0 2.86* 0.003 
2005 7.19% 0.986 $373,492* 0 2.71* 0.004 
2006 6.96% 0.988 $347,228* 0 2.52* 0.009 
2007 0.86% 1 $282,275* 0.01 1.54 0.435 
2008 -2.57% 1 $205,999 0.201 0.88 0.967 
2009 -3.71% 1 $147,842 0.691 0.45 1 
2010 -3.99% 1 $133,518 0.808 0.52 1 
2012 2011 -3.31% 1 $33,889 1 -0.05 1 
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